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CASE COMMENTS
S.E. 654 (1912). The court in the Swope case seems to have applied
the venerable maxim, cessante ratione legis cessat ipsa lex (with
the reason of law ceasing, the law itself ceases). Did the reason for
the law cease in the principal case?
Here, any recovery by the administrator would go to the defendant's wife. It has been long the policy of this state and of the
common law to prohibit tort actions between spouses. To allow
such actions for personal injuries would, it is claimed, impair and
disturb the tranquility of marital felicity. Poling v. Poling, 116
W. Va. 187, 179 S.E. 604 (1935). The same rule was the basis for
preventing an unemancipated child from suing his parent for
injury caused by the parent's negligence. Securo v. Securo, 101
W. Va. 1, 156 S.E. 750 (1931).
In Fetty v. Carroll, 118 W. Va. 401, 190 S.E. 683 (1937), the
court held that the death act is for the exclusive benefit of the
decedent's next of kin, and while the decedent's administrator
alone may sue, his relation to any recovery is not that of decedent's
representative, but that of trustee for the next of kin. "The action
is founded on mere justice and conscience, is in the nature of a bill
in equity, and consequently, is subject to any defense which in
equity and good conscience would preclude a recovery." As was
explained in that case, the administrator has the right of action only
for the benefit of the distributees and any defense good against them
should be good against him. It is left to the reader to determine
whether the fact that the sole beneficiary was the wife of defendant
would be a defense in equity and good conscience.
The existence of beneficiaries is a requisite to the right to sue
under the death statute, and any release or compromise by the
beneficiaries, prior to the action, bars any recovery by the administrator. In view of this and the holding in B. & O.R.R. Co. v. Evans,
188 Fed. 6 (3d Cir. 1911), where the court, in interpreting the
West Virginia statute, said the administrator was a mere formal
party suing on behalf of the real parties in interest, the court in the
instant case appears to be permitting the wife to do indirectly that
which she is precluded by public policy from doing directly; this
being in essence an action by the wife against her husband.
J. L. A.

WRONGFUL DEATH-LIABILITY OF PERSONAL REPRESENTATIvE FOR

CosTs.-D, administrator, brought separate actions for the wrongful
death of his two decedents, under W. VA. CODE c. 55, art. 7, §§ 5, 6
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(Michie, 1949), against P, B. & O.R.R.; and, on appeal, the cases
having been consolidated, judgments in his favor by the lower
court were reversed and costs awarded to P, to be paid out of the
estates' fund in the hands of D. See Daugherty v. B. & O.R.R., 64
S.E.2d 231 (W. Va. 1951). Upon execution by the sheriff no property
was found, the estates having been distributed by D as administrator; P now sues D to recover damages for breach of his administrator's bond in failing to pay the above costs, the question being
whether there was in fact such a breach. Held, on appeal, that
there was no breach of the bond, that D, "as personal representative, and the property belonging to the respective estates are not
liable for costs incurred by the administrator in the actions for
their allegedly wrongful deaths," D being liable only in his personal capacity. State ex rel. B. &cO.R.R. v. Daugherty, 77 S.E.2d 338
(W. Va. 1953)
Thompson v. Mann, 65 W. Va. 648, 64 S.E. 920 (1909), is the
leading case on this problem in West Virginia, being principally
relied on in the present decision, wherein the court cited many
cases as holding that contracts made by the administrator or executor after the decedent's death are personal, although made in
the interest of the estate, and that the estate cannot be charged
for them. See Hall v. McGregor, 65 W. Va. 74, 64 S.E. 736 (1909);
Daingerfield v. Smith, 82 Va. 81, 1 S.E. 599 (1887); Fitzhugh v.
Fitzhugh, 11 Grat. 300 (Va. 1854). West Virginia subsequently reaffirmed this position. Thurmond v. Coal Co., 85 W. Va. 501, 102
S.E. 221 (1920); Bank of Gauley v. Osenton, 92 W. Va. 1, 114 S.E.
435 (1922).
Also cited in the present case is Thompson & Lively v. Mann,
53 W. Va. 432, 44 S.E. 246 (1903), companion case of Thompson
v. Mann, supra, in which Mann, administrator, was held only personally liable for court costs since the judgment was against him
individually; but the court there indicated that had the judgment
been against the estate as well as Mann such would have been
valid. This same rule is similarly indicated in State v. Hudkins,
34 W. Va. 370, 12 S.E. 495 (1890); and it is significant to note that
the trial court in the instant case awarded costs against funds of
the estate in the possession of the administrator. The court in
Thompson v. Mann, supra, distinguished Thompson v. Nowlin,
51 W. Va. 346, 41 S.E. 178 (1902) and Crim v. England, 46 W. Va.
480, 33 S.E. 310 (1899), where, in both instances, the court ordered
payment out of the assets of the estate (as above), by pointing out
that in neither case had there been a settlement of the administra-
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tion accounts or an allowance made to the administrator for counsel fees, as had taken place in Thompson v. Vann, supra. The
court seems to be contradicting itself, in one breath saying that
the administrator is only personally liable, and, in the next, that
the estate may be charged. However, the court further holds in
Thompson v. Mann, supra, and intimates in the present case, that
the administrator would have the right of reimbursement for such
expenses paid personally; and, perhaps, all the above cases in conjunction merely indicate that, where there has been no settlement of
accounts or allowance made, the court may avoid circuity of actions
and order payment directly from the assets of the estate in the
hands of the administrator.
In both Thompson v. Mann, supra, and in the present case
there was a settlement of accounts; but the cases differ in that Mann
was allowed $950 in the settlehent proceedings for attorney's fees,
whereas no allowance appears to have been made for such to
Daugherty at all. Both cases hold that the surety on the administrator's bond is not liable for the latter's personal obligations, and
Daugherty is in the peculiar position of being personally liable,
with no allowance or estate remaining out of which to reimburse
himself. Under our statute, the proceeds of a suit for wrongful
death do not become a part of the estate, subject to the claims of
creditors, but are distributed directly to the next of kin; and the
court may have justified its holding on the ground that, in view
of the above, the estate (creditors) should not be charged with the
costs of such a suit if unsuccessful. There are authorities which
sustain the opposite view that an executor or administrator may
bind the estate for reasonable attorney's fees, etc., necessary in preserving or otherwise benefiting it. See Marx v. McMorran, 136
Mich. 406, 49 N.W. 396 (1904), and Jackson v. Leech, 113 Mich.
391, 71 N.W. 846 (1897), in which cases the Michigan court so
held, its statute providing for the same manner of distribution of
the proceeds as the West Virginia statute. Clearly, the West
Virginia rule places the administrator in a precarious position
when he sues for his decedent's wrongful death, particularly if
strictly followed. The contrary view seems fairer to all the parties
concerned.
G. D. H. S.
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